We study the strategic investment behaviour of oligopsonistic rivals in the labour market. Under wage competition, firms play "puppy dog" with productivityaugmenting investment and "fat cat" with supply-enhancing investment. Under employment competition, investing strategically always involves playing "top dog".
Introduction
Since it was first conceived, the Fudenberg-Tirole "Cats and Dogs" taxonomy of business strategies (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984) has become the standard framework for characterising investment behaviour in an oligopolistic set-up. Ensuing work has produced interesting applications (Neary and Leahy (2000) ) and refinements of the initial taxonomy (Lapham and Ware (1994) , Jun and Vives (2004) ). Common to all of these is the concern with investment strategies that reinforce a firm's position in the output market. Remarkably, the strategic investment behaviour of firms that want to strengthen their position in the input market has not been formally analysed. This paper aims to fill that gap in the literature.
While our analysis applies to input markets in general, we focus on the labour market in particular. This choice is a natural one, especially when viewed in light of recent developments in labour economics. Convincing arguments have been presented to defend the belief that the labour market −like many other markets− is essentially imperfectly competitive, thereby challenging the old paradigm of perfect competition in the labour market (Manning, 2003) . Proponents of this school of thought argue that the labour supply curve facing an individual firm is typically not infinitely elastic but upward sloping, therefore making firms' behaviour monopsonistic or oligopsonistic 1 .
In this paper, we present a taxonomy of investment strategies for firms that have oligopsony power in the labour market and highlight possible implications of labour market policies on strategic investment.
The model
Two firms, i and j, play a two-period game. In the second period, firms act as duopsonists in the labour market. They decide simultaneously, either setting wages (we call this "wage competition") or employment levels ("employment competition"). For conciseness, we solve the model in terms of general "actions" (
) and then discuss the implications for wage (
respectively. Firm i faces the labour supply function:
Henceforth, partial derivatives with respect to actions are subscripted, with A, L and w being suppressed in subscripts where this cannot cause confusion (for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) ) 2 . First, we consider the case in which K has a positive effect on the investing firm's marginal labour productivity. We call this form of investment "productivity-augmenting" (PA).
Alternatively, investment may cause an outward shift in the labour supply curve facing a firm (examples include job advertising as well as within-firm crèche facilities, a commuter shuttle service for firm employees, recreational areas surrounding offices -a nice dining hall, a spacious coffee room, a green zone). This alternative form of investment will be labelled as "supply-enhancing" (SE). In both cases, firms' profits (π ) are given by expressions (2) and (3):
Firm output is denoted by markets (which occur, for instance, because of a desire to avoid congestion and/or cut commuting time to meet the demands of family life). 2 Extending the model to allow investment by both firms is straightforward.
3
. Because investment raises labour productivity,
. Since we assume that firm j does not invest, its output function simply is ) (
. If firms set wages, we use the direct labour supply function in expression (1). With employment-setting firms, we use the inverse
With SE investment we assume that, unlike with PA investment, K does not enter firm i's production function directly, which allows us to distinguish clearly the effects of each type of investment; thus, ) (
. Importantly, investment now shifts the labour supply curve. Hence, we have )
, and ) , (
The investment taxonomy under oligopsony
We now derive optimal investment strategies under oligopsony. In compact notation, we
Using backward induction, we first turn to the second period. Firm i chooses its profit-maximising action given its rival's action,
For brevity, we define
Expression (4) determines firm i's best response function, ) ( Bulow, Geanokopolos and Klemperer (1985) in the oligopoly literature, wages are strategic complements whereas employment levels are strategic substitutes.
Turning to period one, firm i maximises profits with respect to K, taking into account the effect of investment on profits through its rival's second-period action (
The second term in expression (5) is the strategic term. In the absence of strategic behaviour, firm i would choose
. If, however, the strategic term is positive or negative, the firm will −relative to the non-strategic benchmark− overinvest 
From our earlier discussion, we know the sign of ) ( ' π , and the effect of investment on the firm's own action,
under wage competition and π and hinges on the type of investment considered. We now discuss the investment taxonomy for PA and SE investment, respectively.
Productivity-augmenting investment
Under PA investment, 0
both under wage and employment competition. This, combined with the fact that actions are "unfriendly", implies that PA investment always makes the investing firm "tough"
). When firms set wages −bearing in mind that 0
(from expression (5)), which indicates that strategic behaviour involves underinvestment. In the Fudenberg-Tirole (1984) terminology, the firm plays "puppy dog" under wage competition, that is, it chooses to be small and inoffensive. Intuitively, because the investing firm knows a high rival wage reduces its own profits, it wants to suppress it. Given the strategic complementarity between wages, this necessitates a commitment by firm i to a low wage (relative to the non-strategic benchmark). Underinvestment ensures a low future wage since it keeps a firm's labour productivity low. 
Supply-enhancing investment
Our discussion now turns to strategic behaviour under SE investment. Under wage 
Concluding remarks
for strategic investment behaviour. We focus on the effects of a minimum wage, w, using figure 1 in our explanation. Assume w > ) , min( jS iS w w (in figure 1 , w > w iS ). At w, firms' reaction functions exhibit a kink. Firm i's incentive for strategic behaviour is now mitigated as its own wage (and indeed the rival's wage) cannot be pushed below w. In figure 1 , firm i shifts its reaction function only to point M. In the case of PA investment, firm i −although still underinvesting− now invests more than in the case without the minimum wage. With SE investment, firm i overinvests less, which implies that workers −although paid more− receive fewer non-wage benefits on the job. 
